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Abstract 
 
Rice production differs from most other field crops by distinct differences in yields 
across cultivars and rice producers being paid for yield after post-harvest milling.  Using eleven 
years (2003-2013) of Arkansas harvest data from performance trials in six different locations, 
hybrids have 19% higher paddy yields and head rice yield rate 1.7% lower than conventional 
cultivars. Given the 2014 Farm Bill’s emphasis on crop insurance as a risk management tool for 
producers, these variations in yield among cultivars have significant implications for rice 
producers.  Comparing national level, crop insurance data on corn, soybeans and rice indicates 
rice producers strongly prefer yield protection policies (including catastrophic policies) 
compared with corn and soybean producers who prefer revenue protection.  In rice yield and 
revenue crop insurance policies, no premium distinctions are made on the basis of cultivar. 
Adjustments for adverse milling outcomes are made only in the most extreme cases.  Using an 
econometric model to predict paddy yields, milled rice yields and head rice yields, the relative 
returns to yield protection and revenue protection crop insurance are estimated on a per acre 
basis for both hybrid and conventional cultivars.  Additionally, a policy expanding current 
milling deficiency criteria to milling deficiencies is explored.  Results indicate mean loss-cost 
hybrids exceed mean loss-cost ratios for conventional cultivars for revenue protection by 0.37 
and by 0.47 for yield protection. The results also suggest that rice producers should prefer 
revenue protection policies over yield protection policies (based on economic returns), and they 
should insure their rice crops at higher buy-up levels than they currently do.  A revenue 
protection policy that would cover adverse milling outcomes would increase the mean indemnity 
by about 20%. 
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Implications of Rice Cultivar Selection to Optimize Returns from Crop Insurance  
 
I. Introduction 
 
 The passage of the Agricultural Act of 2014 (2014 Farm Bill) brought numerous changes 
for farmers across the country.  Direct and counter-cyclical payments were eliminated, and the 
risk management of crop production now focuses more on crop insurance.  For crops in states 
such as Arkansas, which is largely characterized by operators who irrigate their crops, making 
decisions on crop insurance has taken on added importance because of this increased focus on 
crop insurance.  As Karov et al. argued in 2013, popular crop insurance programs do not target 
row crop producers who irrigate.  High energy costs to lift water increase crop production costs.  
Crop insurance does not offset increased lifting costs due to drought (Karov et al.). To address 
the issue of producer’s not having adequate crop insurance policy options, margin protection 
(MP) policies became available to producers in Arkansas in 2016 but participation in all years 
since then has been negligible (less than 0.01%).  Arkansas’ second most important revenue crop 
is rice, and in 2016 Arkansas was responsible for 42% of US rice revenues.1  Rice received 
favorable treatment in terms of direct and counter cyclical payments under the previous farm bill 
program. With the shift to crop insurance, it is important to take a closer look at the current crop 
insurance program for rice. The current program may fall short of adequately protecting against 
the risks associated with growing rice such as poor rice milling quality.  
Rice producer participation intensity for crop insurance has been low relative to corn and 
soybeans (USDA, RMA. 2018).  On a national basis, the insured proportions of planted acres of 
corn, soybeans and rice have been roughly the same for corn and soybeans (averages of 
proportions from 2014 to 2017) of 88% and 89% with a corresponding average for rice of 94%.2  
However, rice producer participation in terms of buy-up crop insurance coverage (coverage 
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greater than the 50% guarantee) has been much lower.  At the national level, five-year (2014-
2018) proportions of policies by buy-up level, rice had 38% of its policies at the 50% level 
whereas corn and soybeans only had 7% and 6% of their policies at the 50% buy-up level. At the 
higher buy-up levels, the proportions of rice policies are much lower than for corn and soybeans.  
Accordingly, 82% of corn and 84% of soybean policies were at the 70% buy-up level or higher 
and only 50% of rice policies were beyond this threshold from 2014-2018.  The lower level of 
rice coverage is perplexing because from 2001-2017, rice had the highest gross loss ratio (total 
indemnities divided by total premiums) among the seven major US crops (Zulauf et al., 2018).  
Furthermore, rice gross and net loss ratios (indemnity divided by premium less subsidy) for 
2014-2017 exceeded one for both ratios in all four years whereas corn and soybeans had four and 
six ratios less than one over the same period.  In 2015 and 2017, rice crop indemnities in 
Arkansas accounted for 50% and 57%, respectively, of the total indemnities paid to corn, 
soybeans and rice in Arkansas. 
           Rice producers are more likely to buy yield protection (YP) and catastrophic (CAT) 
policies (62% of total policies sold from 2014-2017) compared with corn and soybeans which 
had much larger proportion revenue protection (RP) and RP policies with harvest price exclusion 
(RPHEP) (87% for corn and 88% for soybeans).3  While rice yields are less variable on an 
annual basis than corn and soybeans, YP provides replanting and preventive planting coverage, 
which are more important for rice production. Excessive rainfall during the spring planting 
months is not uncommon in the Mississippi River Delta, and this prevents rice producers from 
being able to plant their rice crop. The number of CAT policies for all row crops in Arkansas 
declined from 13,295 policies sold in 2014 to 9,714 policies sold in 2017 (USDA, RMA. 2014 & 
2017). 
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Unlike other row crops, yield and the outcome of post-harvest processing affect rice 
producers’ revenues.  Rice prices at the mill are directly affected by the milling quality of the 
paddy (rough rice) yield delivered.  Milling takes two forms with rice.  The milled rice yield 
(MRY) is the proportion of paddy rice that becomes either head rice or broken rice.  The head 
rice yield (HRY) is the proportion of paddy rice resulting in kernels that are at least three-fourths 
whole (Hardke and Siebenmorgen, 2013).  Current crop insurance programs provide minimal 
protections to offset losses due to poor milling outcomes. The current industry standard for rice 
milling rate is 70% for MRY and 55% HRY, and any milling rate less than the standard 
isconsidered poor. A poor milling rate results in discounts to the producer’s revenue. The current 
crop insurance programs offer protection to the producer only when the MRY and/or HRY are 
below 68% and/or 48% respectively (USDA, RMA. 2018).  Hence, there is a gap between how 
rice revenues are insured and how they are realized by rice producers. Because the weather 
factors that affect milling yield do not necessarily directly affect paddy yield, there are crop 
seasons where paddy yields are good, however, milling yields are highly variable. The present 
investigation explores a potential policy to provide rice producers protection from adverse 
milling outcomes such as brokens and low head rice yield.  
 Over the past decade, the US rice industry has increased the proportion of rice acreage 
planted to hybrids, going from less than 10% in 2004 to over 38% in 2017 (Hardke 2018). In 
general, hybrids have higher paddy yields than conventional cultivars, but often less favorable 
milling quality (Lanning and Siebenmorgen, 2011).  For the data used for this study, hybrids 
mean paddy yield was 19% higher than conventional cultivars, but head rice yield rates were 1.8 
percentage points lower for hybrid rice.  There are several explanations for perceived inferior 
milling in hybrid rice such as improper milling techniques, excessive chalkiness, etc., but 
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generally hybrids mill lower (Lanning and Siebenmorgen, 2011).  According to data from the 
University of Arkansas, Division of Agriculture, hybrid seed costs for 2018 are estimated at 
approximately $126.50 per acre compared to approximately $36 per acre for conventional rice 
seed (Watkins et al., 2018).   Watkins et al. project that total operating costs per acre of hybrids 
exceed those of conventional varieties by $81.  The increasing use of hybrids in rice planting 
poses an interesting situation for both producers and crop insurance providers.  The only factors 
used in writing policies are four to ten years of actual production history (APH), location (by 
state and county), and buy-up level (50%-85%).  Producers may select the insurance policy type 
and level of coverage.  Premium costs do not distinguish between hybrid and conventional 
cultivars. Studies have yet to examine the benefits of rice crop insurance programs as a function 
of cultivar.  This is important because the cost of hybrid seed exceeds the cost of conventional 
seed, and hybrid cultivar paddy yields exceed those of conventional cultivars.  
 Multiple crop insurance programs are available to rice producers such as revenue 
protection, yield protection, and margin protection.  All rice is irrigated in Arkansas and water is 
generally pumped to minimize moisture scarcity.  Consequently, rice producers might be 
expected to value revenue protection or margin protection since the irrigation itself protects the 
producers’ rice yields from varying.  RP provides direct protection due to revenue (price) 
variation and not solely on yield variation.  RP protects farmers according to a revenue guarantee 
which is determined by coverage level, APH, and a projected price based on a futures contract 
price for rough rice as well as a harvest price adjustment if harvest price exceeds the projected 
price.  After harvest, a producer can draw an indemnity on the difference between revenue 
guarantee and their actual revenue as defined by RMA.4   Margin protection covers increased 
costs, but it has not been embraced by producers.  Mane and Watkins (2016), using data from 
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Arkansas, find that margin protection is unlikely to generate indemnities at low levels of buy-up.  
They hypothesize producers might avoid MP because it is a countywide product and might not 
provide farm level protection when a particular farm’s margins drop. 
 The “actual revenue” as computed for crop insurance purposes generally does not 
consider milling quality unless there are extreme milling deficiencies, as previously discussed.  
For most crops, realized revenue is simply yield per acre multiplied by price per bushel which is 
how insurance programs compute producer revenue per acre.  For rice, however, realized 
revenue is a function of paddy and milling yield and HR and broken rice price.  The prices to rice 
producers use an industry standard milling rate of 55% HRY and 70% MRY.  When a producer’s 
rice mills greater than or less than this industry standard, an adjustment is made to the price 
received by the farmer.  This realized price is used to compute a producer’s realized revenue.  
Milling quality is affected by environmental conditions such as stress during flowering, high 
nighttime temperatures, low solar radiation, low or high harvest moisture content and others 
(Hardke and Siebenmorgen, 2013; Cooper et al., 2008; Lyman et al., 2013).  As noted earlier, 
milling quality can also vary as a function of genetic differences between cultivars.  Rice 
producers are being protected using revenue estimates that do not equal their realized revenues.  
Because of this, a gap exists between producers’ current indemnities and their actual exposures. 
In cases of poor milling, this gap could be upwards of 20% as we show in our analysis.  Given 
the changed risk management structure of the 2014 Farm Bill, producers are relying on crop 
insurance to protect them against their losses and milling yields can be part of those losses.  
This study uses rice production data and weather data from six different research 
locations across Arkansas in order to predict producer revenues over 1000 stochastic simulations 
per location and rice cultivar. The weather data are weather variables that impact rice production 
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variables such as paddy yield, HRY, and MRY. Two current crop insurance programs (YP and 
RP) at 55%, 70%, and 85% buy-up levels for Arkansas rice producers are analyzed relative to 
location and cultivar.  Specifically, we ask what effect do location, cultivar and buy-up have on 
producer revenue under various crop insurance programs?  We also investigate if a revenue 
protection program that more closely insures against adverse milling outcomes would be more 
suitable in terms of reducing revenue fluctuations.  Since 2014, rice producers have 
outperformed major crop producers, such as corn and soybeans, in terms of loss ratios related to 
crop insurance5.  Rice producers also prefer different crop insurance products than corn and 
soybean producers.  We will examine if rice producers’ success from 2014-2017 with crop 
insurance, relative to corn and soybean producers, has been random or if they are pursuing a 
good strategy in terms of mitigating risk and maximizing revenue.  For the sake of achieving 
more complete coverage, we examine the outcome of a proposed policy that would more closely 
compensate for milling deficiencies. 
 
II. Data and Methods 
Data 
Annual Arkansas Rice Performance Trial (ARPT) data were collected from six locations 
in Arkansas over ten years (2003-20136). These locations are indicated on Figure 1.  The 
variables collected from these trials include paddy yield in bushels per acre dried to 12% (𝑌𝑝), 
milled rice yield percentage of paddy yield (MRY), head rice yield percentage of paddy yield 
(HRY), percent harvest moisture content (HMC), cultivar, year of production, and location.  The 
plots were harvested at various HMC levels, but all yields recorded were dried to 12% HMC 
(Frizzel7).  Weather observations were collected for each location for each year using the aWhere 
data base.8  Weather variables collected included vapor pressure difference9 (VPD) in Torr, solar 
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radiation (SOLAR) in W/m2, hours during daylight when temperature is greater than thirty-three 
degrees Celsius (TD33), hours during nighttime when temperature is greater than twenty-two 
degrees Celsius (TN22) (Lyman et al. 2013), and mean daily temperature in Celsius (AvgT).  
Weather variables were observed in two succeeding intervals.  Window one (w1) is the time 
frame from rice plant emerged to when 50% heading was recorded.  This time period is referred 
to as the plant’s vegetative stage.  Window two (w2) defined as the grain filling stage occurs 
from one day after 50% heading to harvest of the plant.  AvgT is averaged over w1 and w2.  
Both hybrid and conventional cultivars were planted at the six locations.  For the purposes of 
crop insurance where no distinction is made by cultivar, the cultivars were put into two broad 
categories:  conventional cultivars and hybrid cultivars. Across all years and locations, there 
were 2,058 observations on conventional cultivars and 460 observations on hybrids.   
 Using the data collected, six ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions were estimated.  
Similar to Lyman et al. (2013), paddy yield models, HRY models and MRY models were 
estimated.  Lyman et al. (2013) used pooled data to estimate yield models where the models 
differed by cultivar planted.  In this study, two models (one for hybrid cultivars and one for 
conventional cultivars) were used to estimate paddy yield.  Lyman et al. estimated separate MRY 
and HRY models for each cultivar in their study.  In similar manner, we estimate one MRY 
model for hybrids and another for conventional cultivars allowing parameter estimates to vary by 
cultivar.  Similarly, two HRY models are estimated, one for hybrid cultivars, and one for 
conventional cultivars.  The results from these estimations are in Appendix A. 
Paddy Yield Model  
Yield was recorded as rough, paddy yield that has been dried to 12% HMC before 
milling.  Yield was measured in bushels (forty-five pounds of rice per bushel).  For the two yield 
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regression models (conventional and hybrid), the natural log of yield (Yp) is specified as a 
function of location (Stuttgart, Corning, Keiser, Newport, Pine Tree and Rohwer) and seven 
different climate variables (w1TN22, w2TN22, w1SOLAR, w2SOLAR, w1VPD, w2VPD and 
AvgT).  In the estimated model, Stuttgart is the base location, so its effect is represented in the 
intercept term. 
 These models were used to predict paddy yield for a given location and cultivar.  Using 
this model, Yp is simulated using @Risk via Microsoft Excel twelve times (six locations, two 
cultivars per location) to predict yields for all possible location and cultivar combinations.  Each 
simulation has 1,000 repetitions. 
MRY Model 
MRY is the observed mass percentage of whole and broken rice kernels remaining after 
milling of paddy rice.  In the two MRY regression models (one for hybrids and one for 
conventional), the logit of MRY (log (MRY/(1 – MRY)) was specified to be a function of the six 
locations, w1TD33, w2TD33, w1TN22, w2TN22 and HMC.10  These models were used to 
predict MRY for a given location for hybrid cultivars and conventional cultivars.  The same 
procedure for simulations was used as for the yield model. 
HRY Model 
 HRY is the observed mass percentage of whole kernels remaining after paddy yield was 
milled.  In the two HRY regression models (one for hybrids and one for conventional) the logit 
of HRY/MRY was specified to be a function of the six locations, w1TD33, w2TD33, w1TN22, 
w2TN22, HMC, and HMC squared (HMC2).  For the simulation, the same procedure for MRY 
simulations was used for HRY simulations.  
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Sources of Uncertainty 
 Our ultimate goal was to simulate the revenues received by producers under various 
insurance policies.  The simulations recognized four sources of uncertainty and were modeled by 
random draws according to the hypothesized distributions.  The first source of uncertainty is due 
to uncertainty about the regression parameters since these estimates are based on sample data.  In 
each of the 1,000 simulations a vector of regression coefficients was drawn assuming normality 
and using the covariance matrix of the parameter estimates.  The second source of uncertainty is 
due to weather variability.  Random draws of the weather variables based on the estimated 
moments of the observed weather over the sample period 2003 – 2013 and across the six 
locations were used as values for the independent variables in the regressions and multiplied 
times the random draws of the parameter coefficients (the first source of uncertainty noted 
above.)  The third source of uncertainty is the randomness due to the additive error terms of each 
regression model.  For a given location and cultivar, three error terms on the original regressions 
were drawn according to a multivariate normal distribution with means zero with the estimated 
three-by-three covariance matrix of the error terms.  After the regression coefficient draws were 
multiplied times their random draws on the independent variables and the random draws on the 
error terms were added, all three dependent variables were transformed back to their natural units 
so that head rice yields and brokens yields in pounds could be computed. 
 The fourth source of uncertainty was harvest price which is required for computing the 
actual revenues producers received.  Harvest price was simulated using a Black-Scholes options 
approach (Hull).  The February 2017 price for computing rice insurance policies by RMA is 
$0.104/lbs.  Using the RMA rice volatility factor of 0.17, the Black-Scholes process generated 
random draws on the harvest price.11 
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III. Crop Insurance Models 
 The simulations for paddy yield (Yp), MRY, HRY, and price were used to generate 
distributions of producer revenue to facilitate comparisons of current crop insurance programs 
available for rice producers.  The two current crop insurance programs analyzed were Revenue 
Protection (RP) and Yield Protection (YP).  We also propose and simulate an alternative crop 
insurance program that might better protect producers from losses related to milling quality.  
This program is referred to as Milling Revenue Protection (MRP).  
 Actual production histories (APH) were calculated for each cultivar and location by 
averaging paddy yield for the four most recent years of data.  Projected price is the January mean 
of the November rough rice contract closing prices, and the projected price is published by RMA 
every February12.  The projected price for 2017 was $0.104 per pound of rice, and this is the 
price used with a volatility factor of 0.17.  Harvest price for the purposes of crop insurance is 
typically the September mean of the November rough rice contract closing prices.  Harvest price 
is simulated as described above.  Although the actual September mean of November rough rice 
closing contact prices was $0.128, we simulate the price 1,000 times since the $0.128 is simply 
one observation and therefore would not generate any generalizable distributions. 
Quality adjustment factors (QAF) were applied to each observation based on the RMA 
guidelines for quality adjustment.13  For any observation where MRY was less than 68% or HRY 
was less than 48%, the following QAF48/68 was applied to paddy yield: 
QAF48/68  = (𝑃𝑎𝑑𝑗/𝑃ℎ)                                                                                        (1) 
𝑌𝑎𝑑𝑗 = 𝑌𝑝 × QAF 48/68                                                                                                     (2) 
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where QAF48/68 is a proportional adjustment; 𝑃𝑎𝑑𝑗 is the realized price a producer receives after 
milling quality discounts are applied (explained below); 𝑃ℎ is the harvest price computed for 
producers and 𝑌𝑎𝑑𝑗is the adjusted yield which a producer uses for crop insurance purposes.
14 
 The revenues producers actually receive (realize) net of indemnities is determined by 
paddy yield, harvest price (whole kernel price and broken kernel price), and milling quality of 
the rice.  Observed rice prices are based on the industry standard milling quality of 55% HRY 
and 70% MRY.  Prices received by an individual producer vary based on deviations of a 
harvested crop from this industry standard.  A producer’s realized revenue (RR) not including 
indemnities is calculated as:  
𝑅𝑅 = 𝑌𝑝 × 𝑃𝑎𝑑𝑗                                                                                                                 (3) 
where: 
𝑃𝑎𝑑𝑗 = [𝑃ℎ + (𝐻𝑅𝑌/(1.00 − 0.55))(𝑃𝑤) + (
𝐵𝑅𝑌
1.00−0.15
)(𝑃𝑏)]                               (4) 
𝑃ℎis the harvest price paid to the producer, 𝑃𝑤is the national loan rate for whole kernels 
published annually by USDA, BRY is the percentage of broken kernels remaining after the 
milling of paddy rice (MRY – HRY); 𝑃𝑏is the national loan rate for broken kernels published 
annually by USDA.  For this analysis 𝑃𝑤 equaled $10.01/cwt and 𝑃𝑏 equaled $6.96/cwt.
15 Note 
that in (1) QAF48/68 is truncated to one if it exceeds one and only is less than one for adjustment 
purposes if MRY is less than 68% or HRY is less than 48% or both.  But for the purposes of 
computing a producer’s revenues received at a mill price gets adjusted for any deviation from 
55/70.16 
Revenue Protection 
 To analyze the impacts on rice farmers of the Revenue Protection (RP) crop insurance 
policy, the yield, MRY and HRY equations were used with the appropriate pricing mechanism to 
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simulate actual producers’ revenue under a RP policy.  Actual producer revenues, producer 
revenues with indemnity payments, the probability of an indemnity payment occurring, and the 
mean indemnity payment over all observations where an indemnity was triggered are computed 
for every location and cultivar combination.  For RP, revenue guarantees (𝑅𝑔
𝑟𝑝
)   are computed 
for each observation based on a given APH, coverage level proportion (C), 𝑃𝑟𝑝 which is the 
larger value of projected price ($0.104/lbs in all simulations) and the simulated harvest price 
(𝑃ℎ).  
𝑅𝑔
𝑟𝑝 = 𝐴𝑃𝐻 × 𝐶 × 𝑃𝑟𝑝                                                                                                     (5)                                                                                                                 
Coverage level (C) can range from 50%-85% (limits set by RMA) depending on producer 
preference.  For RP, a producer’s revenue for insurance payment computations (𝑅𝑎
𝑟𝑝
) is estimated 
based on simulated, adjusted paddy yield per acre (𝑌𝑎𝑑𝑗) and harvest price (𝑃ℎ). 
𝑅𝑎
𝑟𝑝 = 𝑌𝑎𝑑𝑗 × 𝑃ℎ                                    
Indemnity payments are triggered when actual revenue, (𝑅𝑎
𝑟𝑝) is less than the revenue 
guarantee (𝑅𝑔
𝑟𝑝).  Producers are paid the difference between the two.  Simulations were 
performed for this policy over two scenarios with C ranging from 55% (0.55) to 85% (0.85) at 
15% higher coverage levels.  
Yield Protection 
 The yield protection model was simulated in a similar fashion to the RP simulations to 
analyze producer revenues, mean indemnity payments, the probability of an indemnity payment 
occurring, and the mean indemnity payment over all observations where an indemnity was 
triggered for every location and cultivar combination.  For YP, revenue per acre guarantees 
(𝑅𝑔
𝑦𝑝
) are estimated for each observation based on a given APH, coverage level (C) and 
projected paddy rice price (𝑃𝑝).  
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𝑅𝑔
𝑦𝑝 = 𝐴𝑃𝐻 × 𝐶 × 𝑃𝑝.  
Coverage level can range from 50%-85% (0.50-0.85) depending on producer preference but, we 
simulate only for 55%, 70% and 85% coverage levels.  For RP, a producer’s projected revenue 
(𝑅𝑎
𝑦𝑝
) for insurance purposes is based on adjusted paddy yield (𝑌𝑎𝑑𝑗) and projected paddy rice 
price ((𝑃𝑝): 
𝑅𝑎
𝑦𝑝 = 𝑌𝑎𝑑𝑗 × 𝑃𝑝. 
Indemnity payments are triggered when actual revenue per acre (𝑅𝑎
𝑦𝑝)  is less than the revenue 
per acre guarantee (𝑅𝑔
𝑦𝑝).  Producers are paid the difference between the two.  This model was 
run with C ranging from 55% (0.55) to 85% (0.85) at 15% intervals for coverage levels. 
Milling Revenue Protection 
 As noted earlier, there is a gap in revenue insurance for producers whose milling is above 
48% HRY and 68% MRY but one or both of these rates is below 55% HRY and 70% MRY.  
Such a gap suggests exploring an insurance policy that would protect producers from losses due 
to such milling deficiencies.  In this section we propose a policy much like RP, which we call 
milling revenue protection (MRP), with provisions to provide producers with coverage for 
milling deficiencies.  In designing and simulating such a policy it is our intention to find the fair 
market value of such a policy (the mean indemnity) and compare the stability of actual producer 
revenues under such a policy.  For MRP, revenue guarantees are equivalent to 𝑅𝑔
𝑟𝑝 in (5).  For 
MRP, a producer’s realized revenue (RR) which is (3) using the price adjustment due to milling 
yield deviations as in (4) 
Indemnity payments are triggered when actual revenue RR is less than the revenue 
guarantee (𝑅𝑔
𝑟𝑝).  Producers are paid on the difference between the two.  This model was 
simulated with C ranging from 55% (0.55) to 85% (0.85) at 15% intervals. 
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USDA Cost Estimator  
 To evaluate the RP and YP programs, premium levels were needed for each location and 
cultivar.  The USDA Cost Estimator17 program was used to estimate the producer paid 
premium18 per acre for a given location and cultivar.  It should be noted that even though 
simulations vary between hybrid and conventional, no distinction is made by the Cost Estimator 
on the basis of cultivar. Therefore, differing by cultivar characteristics might favor one cultivar 
over the other.  For each research station, location was defined as the county in which the station 
resided.  In addition to that, each location and cultivar’s APH for the most recent four years19 of 
data was used as “Approved Yield” and “Rate Yield”.  Since there were no substitution yields or 
yield floors used, Approved Yield always equaled Rate Yield.20  We also assumed complete 
ownership of the crop by producers, so “Insured Share Percent” always equaled 100%.  The 
projected prices were left at the 100% published price level at $0.104/lbs.  After all the 
information was inputted, the “Get Estimates” button was selected.  “Producer Premium 
Amount” was selected and the premium values for RP and YP are given at various coverage 
levels.  
IV. Results 
Sample Characteristics and Estimation 
 As indicated in Table 1 for all observations pooled, hybrid cultivars have 19% higher (p < 
0.01) paddy yields than conventional cultivars across all locations.  This is consistent with the 
previous literature about hybrid yield production versus conventional yield production (Jiang, 
2016).  Hybrids also have larger yield variability (p < 0.01) than conventional cultivars with a 
hybrid standard deviation of 51.5 bushels compared with 38.2 bushels for conventional cultivars.  
Hybrid and conventional MRY are statistically equal to the industry standard of 70%.  Hybrid 
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HRY averages 2% lower (p < 0.01) compared to conventional cultivars, offsetting the hybrid 
rough rice yield advantage.  While hybrid cultivars exhibit lower HRY, hybrid cultivars also 
have lower milling variation than conventional cultivars by 0.5% for MRY (3.2% for hybrid 
versus 3.7% for conventional, p < 0.01) and 1.3% for HRY (8.8% for hybrid versus 10.1% for 
conventional, p < 0.01). 
The sample data from the six research locations over ten years gives a baseline for the 
cultivar characteristics in Arkansas (Table 2).  Location exhibits an important role in production 
variability, and the location differences on paddy yield, MRY, and HRY and their dispersions are 
shown in Table 2.  Paddy yields were the lowest in Rohwer which is the southernmost of the six 
locations. Milling quality was also the worst in Rohwer.  Newport and Corning posted the 
highest paddy yields, and Corning had higher MRY and HRY for both hybrid and conventional 
cultivars than any other location.  In five of the six locations, hybrids had a larger yield standard 
deviation than conventional cultivars. 
 As is clear from Tables 3 and 4 that display premiums for RP and YP, Newport clearly 
has the highest premiums.  This could be explained by high yields and large standard deviations, 
but Keiser has high standard deviations although lower mean yields but premiums roughly 67% 
those of Newport.  This seeming anomaly may be explained by a claims history not evident in 
our data.  This anomaly may also be an artifact that the six locales are at one specific point in 
each county.  The premiums likely reflect actual claims histories from the entire county over 
many years which may exhibit variability not evident in our site-specific data. 
Differences Between Revenue Protection and Yield Protection 
 Location affects yield and milling quality due to differences such as soil type and   
climate.  This suggests different cultivars may be more suitable to some locations and insurance 
16 
 
policy types.  Results from simulating production and revenue based on location, cultivar, and 
climate under RP and YP are displayed in Tables 3 and 4 for coverage at 55%, 70% and 85%.  
“Loss-Cost Ratio” is the mean indemnity payment over 1,000 iterations divided by producer paid 
premium.  The larger the ratio, the more valuable the crop insurance plan and vice versa.  In 
three locations, Stuttgart, Rohwer and Pine Tree, showed RP and YP policies have higher ratios 
for hybrid cultivars than conventional cultivars.  The opposite happened in Newport and 
Corning, and in Keiser neither cultivar exhibited substantive differences in loss cost ratios.  The 
average of the 18 (six locations across the three buy-up levels) Loss-Cost ratios for hybrids (2.15 
(RP) and 2.10 (YP)) and the 18 for conventionals (1.79 (RP) and 1.63 (YP)) show that the mean 
for hybrids is greater in tables 3 and 4 are than the respective means for conventionals.  
Moreover, the mean Lost-Cost ratios for RP exceed those of YP for the respective cultivars.  
For RP and YP, hybrid cultivars grown in Stuttgart proved to have highest Loss-Cost 
ratios at the 55%, 70% and 85% coverage levels across the six locations.  This is undoubtedly 
due to the high Stuttgart APH for hybrids (222 bu/ac) relative to the mean yield (202 bu/ac) 
when compared with conventionals’ APH (180 bu/ac) compared to mean yield (173 bu/ac).  In 
Newport a reverse situation appears where APH is much lower (34 bu/ac lower) for hybrids than 
their mean yields and not nearly as large of a spread for conventionals.  Newport’s loss cost 
ratios are much lower than Stuttgart’s for both hybrid and conventional cultivars.  In the Corning 
case the APH for hybrids (228 bu/ac) is lower than the mean hybrid yield (244 bu/ac) but 
conventionals’ APH (204 bu/ac) is higher than its mean (193 bu/ac).  The location least affected 
by differences between APHs and their respective mean yields is Pine Tree where APH for 
hybrids equals its mean, 206 bu/ac, and conventionals’ APH differ by 1 bu/ac.  At that location, 
hybrids have higher loss-cost ratios for both RP and YP. Since the mean yield advantage for 
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hybrids is offset by its APH, the difference might be due to the greater variability of hybrid 
yields. 
These results indicate that having an APH higher than the long-term yield trend is 
advantageous for producers.  So, producers with a low APH relative to their long term mean 
yields are less likely to benefit from YP or RP.  In our simulations, the premia are not calibrated 
sufficiently to offset this disadvantage. 
An intriguing pattern emerges in the magnitudes of loss cost ratios going from 55% to 
70%.  For both policies, all locations and both cultivars, the loss cost ratios increase in going 
from 55% to 70%. For RP, in eleven of the twelve scenarios, loss cost ratios decline in going 
from 70% to 85%.  A different result occurs for YP.  In seven of the twelve scenarios, the loss 
cost ratio increases between the 70% to 85% buy-up although the loss ratios from 70% to 85% 
are within 2%-3% of each other, much closer than in the RP case.  Revenue protection policies 
proved to have higher indemnity to premium ratios than YP policies for every location and both 
cultivars at the 55% and 70% levels except for hybrids in Stuttgart.  At the 85% level, nine of the 
twelve comparisons favored YP.  On average, at 55% and 70%, RP loss cost ratios exceeded YP 
ratios by 0.38 and 0.14.  At 85%, the mean YP ratio exceeded the mean RP ratio by 0.22.  
However, if coverage is at the 85% level, YP is likely preferable.  This suggests RP has a better 
return on premia at the 55% and 70% levels.   
In differentiating by cultivar and buy-up level, the mean RP loss cost ratio for 
conventionals exceeds those for YP by 0.6 and 0.10 at 55% and 70%.  In contrast, at 85% the 
mean hybrid YP loss cost ratio exceeds the mean RP ratio by 0.13.  So, there is some interaction 
between cultivar, policy type and buy-up level. 
18 
 
Revenue protection policies also had higher mean indemnity payments and indemnity 
frequencies for every cultivar, location and buy-up level.  Revenue protection policies also have 
higher premium costs than YP policies to accommodate for increased protection against price 
fluctuations.  The premiums between hybrid cultivars and conventional cultivars were roughly 
equal for a given policy type (RP or YP) at a given location. On average, RP premiums were 
12% higher for hybrid cultivars compared to conventional cultivars, and YP premiums were 10% 
higher for hybrid cultivars compared to conventional cultivars. Since crop insurance policies do 
not factor in cultivar variation in premium costs, hybrid cultivars mean differences in loss cost 
ratios between hybrid and conventional cultivars averaged over buy-up levels are 0.37 for RP 
and 0.47 for YP.  However, if Stuttgart is removed from these calculations, the mean differences 
reduce to 0.07 and 0.04.  So, it appears hybrids have an edge in return per dollar of premium in 
both RP and YP policies, likely due to the increase in yield variation for hybrid cultivars over 
conventional cultivars. 
Milling Revenue Protection 
 Our proposed MRP policy can only be evaluated on indemnity frequency and mean 
indemnity paid since the premium costs cannot be calculated with the USDA Cost Estimator.  
The mean indemnities and indemnity frequencies by cultivar and location are displayed in Table 
5.  As to be expected, the mean indemnities and frequencies of indemnities for MRP exceed 
those for RP.  Across all coverage levels, the MRP mean indemnity for hybrids was 20% higher 
than for the mean RP indemnity.  Likewise, the mean MRP indemnity across all conventional 
cultivars was 18.7% higher than the mean RP conventional cultivar indemnity.  The gap between 
MRP and YP is greater with mean MRP hybrid indemnities 148% higher than mean YP 
conventional indemnities.  For conventional varieties MRP mean indemnities exceeded those of 
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YP by 109%.   Figures 2 and 3 show that MRP provides producers with increased mean 
indemnity payments (Figure 2) and increased indemnity frequencies (Figure 3) although the 
margins between MRP and RP indemnities are narrow, they do expand with the buy-up level. 
The increased indemnity payments and frequencies come from expanding the quality adjustment 
threshold.  As a consequence, premiums for MRP would likely be higher than for RP, roughly 
20% given the increase in the mean indemnities cited above.  
Producer Revenue Risk Reduction 
 In Tables 6-8, mean producer realized revenue is shown with and without mean 
indemnity payments from RP, YP, and MRP.  Comparing realized revenue between hybrid 
cultivars and conventional cultivars, hybrids have higher revenues than conventional cultivars 
across all locations as would be expected given hybrid’s higher mean yields.  Conventional 
cultivars, however, have lower variation in realized revenue than hybrid cultivars, as shown by 
the standard deviations in Tables 6-8.  The same holds true for realized revenue plus indemnity 
payments.  Hybrid cultivars have higher variability than conventional cultivars in realized 
revenue.  As shown in the tables, coefficients of variation (standard deviation divided by the 
mean) which are measures of relative risk, are lower in realized revenue for conventional 
cultivars.  For total revenue, the RP has seventeen of eighteen differences (three buy-up levels 
for each location) in coefficients of variation favor hybrids as riskier.  The same is true in YP and 
MRP.  For YP, seventeen of eighteen differences favor conventional cultivars as less risky which 
is also true for MRP in seventeen of eighteen cases. 
When comparing crop insurance policies, Tables 6-8 show that RP and MRP decrease 
producer revenue variation more compared to YP.  Producers selecting RP or MRP can expect to 
see higher realized revenues (with indemnities) than those who enroll in YP (Figure 4). 
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Premiums are not deducted out of the mean revenues (because we have no premium for MRP), 
but in viewing Figure 4, even with premiums deducted, producer profits will likely still be 
greater under RP and MRP given the generally small differences in RP and YP premiums 
displayed in Tables 3 and 4.  There is minimal realized revenue variation difference between RP 
and MRP although total revenues under MRP have lower standard deviations for all locations 
and cultivars.  Given that the margins are small between indemnity payments between RP and 
MRP, the differences in total revenues (with indemnities) are also negligible. 
Cultivar Selection  
 Producers make annual decisions on cultivar selection and crop insurance policy 
selection.  As demonstrated in Tables 1 and 2, hybrids have higher mean yields and variation in 
annual yields than conventional cultivars.  This is reflected in the revenues in Tables 6-8.  This 
variation carries over when indemnities are added to realized revenues.  Hybrid cultivars have 
higher variation among realized revenues (with indemnities) than conventional cultivars for all 
locations, policy types and buy-up levels.  As noted earlier, hybrid seed costs more than 
conventional seed and has higher overall operating costs so this must be considered adjusting 
expected net revenues.     
As evident from the results in Tables 3 and 4, cultivar selection and the best ratio of 
indemnity to premium is very much influenced by the difference between APH and mean yields 
over a longer period of time.  The most neutral site for comparing hybrid versus conventional is 
Pine Tree.  For both RP and YP, hybrids have higher loss cost ratios than conventional cultivars.  
Moreover, the reduction in revenue standard deviations due to insurance is less for conventional 
cultivars in four of the six locations with Newport and Corning the exceptions. 
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V. Conclusion 
 The 2014 Farm Bill made crop insurance the cornerstone for risk management in the rice 
industry.  Our analysis shows that hybrid cultivars generate higher variability in producer 
realized revenues and higher total realized revenues compared to conventional cultivars.  
Producers must decide between selecting a less risky cultivar or a cultivar with the potential of 
higher revenues with greater risk.  Our analysis also showed that hybrids had higher mean 
(averaged over the six locations) Loss-Cost ratios over conventional cultivars for any buy-up 
level for both RP and YP policy types.  Our analysis indicates hybrids offered a better return on 
premiums than conventional cultivars when APH equaled long run expected yields for both yield 
protection and revenue protection.  While this finding is particular to a given county and requires 
further research, it suggests that because of different yield and milling characteristics, perhaps 
premia should be determined separately for hybrids versus conventional cultivars.  While 
cultivar currently is partially incorporated into premia via the APH effect, the greater variability 
of hybrid yields, and poorer milling properties are not.  Our results also indicate the sensitivity of 
loss cost ratios to the relationship of APH to longer term yield trends.  An APH higher than the 
longer-term trend indicates better returns to policies and the reverse for APH lower than longer 
term trend.  
Arkansas rice producers showed a clear preference for yield protection policies over 
revenue protection policies in 2018.  This is somewhat perplexing because our results show that 
RP has a better return per dollar of premium at lower buy-up levels (55% and 70%) and YP at 
85% buy-up.  Since Arkansas rice producers have displayed a clear preference for lower buy-up 
levels, RP would seem the policy type to be preferred.  Our results also show increasing loss cost 
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ratios going from 55% to 70% buy-up, so it would seem rice producers should be purchasing 
higher buy-up levels.   
Revenue protection as currently sold does not provide protection against adverse milling 
yields except in extreme cases.  Our proposed milling revenue protection policy of covering all 
adverse milling yields at some level indicate that such coverage would further decrease total 
revenue variability.  To pay for this additional protection, higher premiums would likely be 
charged than current revenue protection premiums which we estimate at a 20% increase. 
Our analysis focused on two existing policies—revenue protection and yield protection—
and a third that insures producers against more modest milling quality deviations than is the 
current policy.  As Karov et al. concluded in their study on crop insurance in the Southern United 
States, current crop insurance does not protect producers’ profit margins in the South.  The rice 
margin protection policy currently offered by RMA has not been popular. High energy costs due 
to irrigation are the main source of variation in Arkansas production costs.  An insurance policy 
based solely on irrigation needs throughout the growing season is deserving of further 
consideration. 
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VI. Endnotes  
1 http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/state-fact-sheets.aspx  Accessed June 27,2018 
 
2 Authors’ computations from RMA and NASS data. 
 
3 Author’s computations using RMA data for YP, CAT, RP and RPHPE policies sold. 
 
4 For insurance purposes, actual revenue is actual paddy yield times the September mean of the 
November rough rice closing price.  Yield protection follows the same model except price stays 
constant between revenue guarantee and actual revenue. 
http://www.rma.usda.gov/fields/ms_rso/2014/ricearkmstn.pdf 
 
5 https://prodwebnlb.rma.usda.gov/apps/SummaryofBusiness/ 
 
6 Usable observations were not available for 2011.  Data were obtained from: 
  University of Arkansas Cooperative Extension Service (UACES). Various Years. Arkansas rice  
  performance trials (ARPT). Available at: 
http://www.aragriculture.org/crops/rice/PerfTrials/default.htm  
 
7 Personal communication, Donna Frizzel, June 25, 2014. 
 
8 http://www.awhere.com/en-us/weather-details  
 
9 VPD is a measure of humidity. 
 
10 The logit transformation was used to avoid getting predicted MRY greater than one or less 
than zero. 
 
11 The exact formula is: EXP(ln(0.139)-(0.5*(.10)2)*(0.75)+( ε)*(0.10)*(0.75)0.5) where ε is a 
randomly generated standard normal random variable. 
 
12 https://prodwebnlb.rma.usda.gov/apps/PriceDiscovery/GetPrices/YourPrice 
 
13 https://www.rma.usda.gov/-/media/RMAweb/Handbooks/Coverage-Plans---18000/Crop-
Insurance-Handbook---18010/2019-Crop-Insurance-Handbook.ashx 
 
14 Marvin Dearien, Rain and Hail, LLC. Personal communication, August 27, 2014 
 
15 https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Assets/USDA-FSA-Public/usdafiles/Price-
Support/pdf/2017/2017ricelr.pdf 
 
16 If Padj in (4) is divided by Ph we get QAF55/70. 
 
17 https://ewebapp.rma.usda.gov/apps/costestimator/ 
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18 Crop insurance premiums are subsidized by the federal government. 
 
19 APH for each location and cultivar was estimated as the 4-year average paddy yield for 2009, 
2010, 2012, 2013. 
 
20 Travis Johnson, Risk Management Agency. Personal communication, August 27, 2014. 
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VIII. Appendix 
Tables 
Table 1. Mean paddy yield, MRY, and HRY by cultivar 2003-2013 
 
Cultivar Variable n Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Hybrid 
Yield (bu/ac) 460 210 51.5 35 336 
MRY (%) 460 70 3.2 53 82 
HRY (%) 460 57 8.8 18 72 
Conv. 
Yield (bu/ac) 2058 176 38.2 12 325 
MRY (%) 2058 70 3.7 42 98 
HRY (%) 2058 59 10.1 7 90 
 
Note: Data does not include 2011 because of insufficient observations 
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Table 2: Mean paddy yield, MRY, HRY and APH by location and cultivar (2003-2013)  
Location Variety n APH (bu/ac) Yield (bu/ac) MRY (%) HRY (%) 
Stuttgart 
Hybrid 83 222 202 70 58 
Std. Dev.     41.8 1.9 5.3 
Conventional 413 180 173 70 63 
Std. Dev.     27.8 2.4 5.7 
Keiser 
Hybrid 93 196 189 69 56 
Std. Dev.     59.7 4.0 8.3 
Conventional 425 185 172 69 57 
Std. Dev.     42.6 4.9 10.1 
Rohwer 
Hybrid 34 160 171 67 48 
Std. Dev.     33.0 6.7 19.2 
Conventional 158 150 151 69 52 
Std. Dev.     33.3 6.1 19.0 
Newport 
Hybrid 99 186 220 70 59 
Std. Dev.     50.7 2.2 5.7 
Conventional 426 161 177 70 59 
Std. Dev.     44.4 2.5 7.3 
Corning 
Hybrid 97 228 244 71 60 
Std. Dev.     40.8 1.6 7.6 
Conventional 395 204 193 71 60 
Std. Dev.     34.1 2.7 11.3 
Pine 
Tree 
Hybrid 54 206 206 70 57 
Std. Dev.     38.2 2.5 5.7 
Conventional 241 171 172 71 60 
Std. Dev.     30.1 3.0 6.3 
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Table 3. Revenue protection mean indemnities, frequencies and returns to premiums 
Note: Mean indemnities are estimated over 1,000 iterations 
Producer Premium ($) Mean Indemnity ($) Indemnity Frequency (%) Loss-Cost Ratio 
Coverage Level Coverage Level Coverage Level Coverage Level 
Location Cultivar 55% 70% 85% 55% 70% 85% 55% 70% 85% 55% 70% 85% 
Stuttgart 
Hybrid 5.00 14.00 40.00 19.96 68.37 156.72 17.7 42.8 64.7 3.99 4.88 3.92 
Conv. 4.00 11.00 34.00 7.91 30.95 83.12 8.6 27.9 51.2 1.98 2.81 2.44 
Keiser 
Hybrid 8.00 18.00 51.00 12.21 42.75 102.81 12.1 31.7 51.3 1.53 2.38 2.02 
Conv. 7.00 18.00 49.00 11.19 38.71 98.23 12.2 31.7 54.9 1.60 2.15 2.00 
Rohwer 
Hybrid 5.00 12.00 36.00 10.49 31.00 70.96 12.4 25.6 42.8 2.10 2.58 1.97 
Conv. 5.00 11.00 34.00 6.36 23.12 58.36 8.5 23.0 42.8 1.27 2.10 1.72 
Newport 
Hybrid 15.00 29.00 73.00 4.92 20.40 55.02 5.8 18.1 33.6 0.33 0.70 0.75 
Conv. 14.00 26.00 66.00 6.29 21.93 54.85 8.1 19.6 37.0 0.45 0.84 0.83 
Corning 
Hybrid 9.00 21.00 60.00 16.93 55.71 128.08 15.0 32.7 54.4 1.88 2.65 2.13 
Conv. 8.00 20.00 55.00 19.86 63.98 143.69 18.5 42.0 63.2 2.48 3.20 2.61 
Pine 
Tree 
Hybrid 8.00 19.00 54.00 9.64 37.21 94.65 10.6 27.0 48.0 1.20 1.96 1.75 
Conv. 7.00 16.00 47.00 5.83 23.27 64.46 7.0 22.9 43.1 0.83 1.45 1.37 
3
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Table 4. Yield protection mean indemnities, frequencies and returns to premiums 
Producer Premium ($) Mean Indemnity ($) 
Indemnity Frequency 
(%) Loss-Cost Ratio 
Coverage Level Coverage Level Coverage Level Coverage Level 
Location Cultivar 55% 70% 85% 55% 70% 85% 55% 70% 85% 55% 70% 85% 
Stuttgart 
Hybrid 3.00 9.00 24.00 12.46 49.83 123.74 13.7 36.3 58.7 4.15 5.54 5.16 
Conv. 3.00 8.00 21.00 4.49 20.28 62.17 6.3 21.4 44.6 1.50 2.53 2.96 
Keiser 
Hybrid 6.00 14.00 37.00 6.85 29.82 79.07 9.5 25.3 45.7 1.14 2.13 2.14 
Conv. 5.00 13.00 35.00 5.73 26.28 75.40 8.3 24.9 48.7 1.15 2.02 2.15 
Rohwer 
Hybrid 4.00 9.00 24.00 5.48 20.79 53.50 8.5 20.5 37.8 1.37 2.31 2.23 
Conv. 4.00 8.00 24.00 2.78 14.56 43.26 5.4 18.6 37.2 0.69 1.82 1.80 
Newport 
Hybrid 13.00 23.00 59.00 1.93 11.22 37.26 2.7 11.8 28.5 0.15 0.49 0.63 
Conv. 12.00 21.00 54.00 2.78 13.41 39.54 5.0 14.5 32.5 0.23 0.64 0.73 
Corning 
Hybrid 7.00 16.00 43.00 9.39 39.07 99.85 11.0 27.1 47.7 1.34 2.44 2.32 
Conv. 6.00 15.00 40.00 11.92 47.17 114.61 14.0 36.6 57.4 1.99 3.14 2.87 
Pine 
Tree 
Hybrid 6.00 14.00 39.00 4.79 24.30 68.95 6.2 20.5 41.8 0.80 1.74 1.77 
Conv. 5.00 12.00 34.00 3.01 14.88 46.12 4.6 17.3 35.2 0.60 1.24 1.36 
Note: Mean indemnities are estimated over 1,000 iterations
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Table 5. Milling revenue protection mean indemnities, frequencies and returns to premiums 
    Mean Indemnity ($) Indemnity Frequency (%) 
    Coverage Level Coverage Level 
Location Cultivar 55% 70% 85% 55% 70% 85% 
Stuttgart 
Hybrid 26.38 82.04 177.49 22.3 47.3 68.2 
              
Conv. 10.22 36.52 93.68 10.7 31.2 54.8 
              
Keiser 
Hybrid 16.92 54.81 123.34 15.9 37.9 56.5 
              
Conv. 14.93 47.87 114.18 15.6 36.6 59.6 
              
Rohwer 
Hybrid 12.64 36.70 81.46 15.0 29.5 47.4 
              
Conv. 7.60 27.72 69.30 10.4 27.6 49.6 
              
Newport 
Hybrid 6.13 24.98 65.69 7.3 21.8 39.1 
              
Conv. 8.29 27.91 66.80 11.1 24.5 42.7 
              
Corning 
Hybrid 22.46 70.69 153.37 19.7 39.5 59.2 
              
Conv. 24.01 75.39 163.57 22.4 48.0 68.7 
              
Pine Tree 
Hybrid 13.68 46.84 110.13 14.1 31.1 52.3 
              
Conv. 8.50 30.72 77.28 10.5 27.3 47.3 
              
 
Note: Mean indemnities are estimated over 1,000 iterations 
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Table 6. Realized producer revenue by location and cultivar under revenue protection ($/ac) 
Mean 
Realized 
Revenue 
Mean Indemnity Mean Total Revenue 
Coverage Level Coverage Level 
Location Cultivar 55% 70% 85% 55% 70% 85% 
Stuttgart 
Hybrid 927.28 19.96 68.37 156.72 947 996 1084 
Std. Dev. 322 56 109 167 300 264 220 
CV 0.35 2.79 1.60 1.07 0.32 0.27 0.20 
Conv. 842.53 7.91 30.95 83.12 850 873 926 
Std. Dev. 264 33 68 114 253 232 197 
CV 0.31 4.17 2.21 1.37 0.30 0.27 0.21 
Keiser 
Hybrid 910.88 12.21 42.75 102.81 923 954 1014 
Std. Dev. 306 42 84 136 291 264 225 
CV 0.34 3.40 1.97 1.32 0.32 0.28 0.22 
Conv. 852.01 11.19 38.71 98.23 863 891 950 
Std. Dev. 265 37 78 125 251 228 193 
CV 0.31 3.34 2.01 1.27 0.29 0.26 0.20 
Rohwer 
Hybrid 849.79 10.49 31.00 70.96 860 881 921 
Std. Dev. 302 36 70 110 288 269 240 
CV 0.36 3.41 2.24 1.55 0.34 0.31 0.26 
Conv. 780.73 6.36 23.12 58.36 787 804 839 
Std. Dev. 249 26 55 93 241 225 199 
CV 0.32 4.07 2.39 1.59 0.31 0.28 0.24 
Newport 
Hybrid 1057.25 4.92 20.40 55.02 1062 1078 1112 
Std. Dev. 361 26 57 101 354 339 312 
CV 0.34 5.20 2.79 1.84 0.33 0.31 0.28 
Conv. 855.34 6.29 21.93 54.85 862 877 910 
Std. Dev. 276 27 57 96 268 252 227 
CV 0.32 4.29 2.60 1.74 0.31 0.29 0.25 
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Table 6. Cont. 
 
    Mean 
Realized 
Revenue 
Mean Indemnity Mean Total Revenue 
    Coverage Level Coverage Level 
Location Cultivar     55% 70% 85% 55% 70% 85% 
Corning 
Hybrid 1071.27 16.93 55.71 128.08 1088 1127 1199 
Std. Dev. 371 52 104 164 352 320 277 
CV 0.35 3.07 1.87 1.28 0.32 0.28 0.23 
Conv. 876.46 19.86 63.98 141.69 896 940 1020 
Std. Dev. 282 54 103 155 260 226 185 
CV 0.32 2.72 1.61 1.09 0.29 0.24 0.18 
Pine 
Tree 
Hybrid 980.86 9.64 37.21 94.65 990 1018 1076 
Std. Dev. 330 37 80 134 318 293 256 
CV 0.34 3.84 2.15 1.42 0.32 0.29 0.24 
Conv. 851.73 5.83 23.27 64.46 858 875 916 
Std. Dev. 269 28 59 101 261 243 213 
CV 0.32 4.80 2.54 1.57 0.30 0.28 0.23 
 
Note: Mean indemnities are estimated over 1,000 iterations 
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Table 7. Realized producer revenue by location and cultivar under yield protection ($/ac) 
Mean 
Realized 
Revenue 
Mean Indemnity Mean Total Revenue 
Coverage Level Coverage Level 
Location Cultivar 55% 70% 85% 55% 70% 85% 
Stuttgart 
Hybrid 927.28 12.46 49.83 123.74 940 977 1051 
Std. Dev. 322 39 89 146 307 278 239 
CV 0.35 3.15 1.79 1.18 0.33 0.28 0.23 
Conv. 842.53 4.49 20.28 62.17 847 863 905 
Std. Dev. 264 22 53 96 258 242 213 
CV 0.31 4.87 2.62 1.54 0.30 0.28 0.24 
Keiser 
Hybrid 910.88 6.85 29.82 79.07 918 941 990 
Std. Dev. 306 28 67 116 297 275 242 
CV 0.34 4.07 2.25 1.47 0.32 0.29 0.24 
Conv. 852.01 5.73 26.28 75.40 858 878 927 
Std. Dev. 265 25 60 106 257 238 207 
CV 0.31 4.29 2.30 1.41 0.30 0.27 0.22 
Rohwer 
Hybrid 849.79 5.48 20.79 53.50 855 871 903 
Std. Dev. 302 23 53 92 294 278 252 
CV 0.36 4.24 2.57 1.71 0.34 0.32 0.28 
Conv. 780.73 2.78 14.56 43.26 784 795 824 
Std. Dev. 249 15 40 75 245 232 209 
CV 0.32 5.34 2.74 1.74 0.31 0.29 0.25 
Newport 
Hybrid 1057.25 1.93 11.22 37.26 1059 1068 1095 
Std. Dev. 361 14 39 79 358 347 325 
CV 0.34 7.25 3.48 2.12 0.34 0.32 0.30 
Conv. 855.34 2.78 13.41 39.54 858 869 895 
Std. Dev. 276 15 41 77 272 260 238 
CV 0.32 5.40 3.06 1.95 0.32 0.30 0.27 
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Table 7. Cont. 
 
    Mean 
Realized 
Revenue 
Mean Indemnity Mean Total Revenue 
    Coverage Level Coverage Level 
Location Cultivar     55% 70% 85% 55% 70% 85% 
Corning 
Hybrid 1071.27 9.39 39.07 99.85 1081 1110 1171 
Std. Dev. 371 34 82 140 359 332 294 
CV 0.35 3.62 2.10 1.40 0.33 0.30 0.25 
Conv. 876.46 11.92 47.17 114.61 888 924 991 
Std. Dev. 282 39 84 136 267 238 202 
CV 0.32 3.27 1.78 1.19 0.30 0.26 0.20 
Pine 
Tree 
Hybrid 980.86 4.79 24.30 68.95 986 1005 1050 
Std. Dev. 330 24 61 111 323 304 273 
CV 0.34 5.01 2.51 1.61 0.33 0.30 0.26 
Conv. 851.73 3.01 14.88 46.12 855 867 898 
Std. Dev. 269 17 44 83 264 252 227 
CV 0.32 5.65 2.96 1.80 0.31 0.29 0.25 
 
Note: Mean indemnities are estimated over 1,000 iterations 
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Table 8. Realized producer revenue by location and cultivar under milling revenue protection 
($/ac) 
Mean 
Realized 
Revenue 
Mean Indemnity Mean Total Revenue 
Coverage Level Coverage Level 
Location Cultivar 55% 70% 85% 55% 70% 85% 
Stuttgart 
Hybrid 927.28 26.38 82.04 177.49 954 1009 1105 
Std. Dev. 322 64 120 176 294 256 212 
CV 0.35 2.41 1.46 0.99 0.31 0.25 0.19 
Conv. 842.53 10.22 36.52 93.68 853 879 936 
Std. Dev. 264 37 75 121 251 227 192 
CV 0.31 3.61 2.04 1.29 0.29 0.26 0.20 
Keiser 
Hybrid 910.88 16.92 54.81 123.34 928 966 1034 
Std. Dev. 306 49 95 147 286 254 213 
CV 0.34 2.90 1.73 1.19 0.31 0.26 0.21 
Conv. 852.01 14.93 47.87 114.18 867 900 966 
Std. Dev. 265 44 87 134 247 221 184 
CV 0.31 2.96 1.82 1.17 0.28 0.25 0.19 
Rohwer 
Hybrid 849.79 12.64 36.70 81.46 862 886 931 
Std. Dev. 302 39 75 116 286 263 232 
CV 0.36 3.09 2.04 1.43 0.33 0.30 0.25 
Conv. 780.73 7.60 27.72 69.30 788 808 850 
Std. Dev. 249 28 59 98 239 220 191 
CV 0.32 3.73 2.15 1.41 0.30 0.27 0.22 
Newport 
Hybrid 1057.25 6.13 24.98 65.69 1063 1082 1123 
Std. Dev. 361 28 62 108 353 334 303 
CV 0.34 4.57 2.48 1.64 0.33 0.31 0.27 
Conv. 855.34 8.29 27.91 66.80 864 883 922 
Std. Dev. 276 30 63 104 266 247 218 
CV 0.32 3.62 2.26 1.56 0.31 0.28 0.24 
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Table 8. Cont. 
 
    Mean 
Realized 
Revenue 
Mean Indemnity Mean Total Revenue 
    Coverage Level Coverage Level 
Location Cultivar   55% 70% 85% 55% 70% 85% 
Corning 
Hybrid 1071.27 22.46 70.69 153.37 1094 1142 1225 
Std. Dev. 371 58 115 175 346 308 261 
CV 0.35 2.58 1.63 1.14 0.32 0.27 0.21 
Conv. 876.46 24.04 75.39 163.57 900 952 1040 
Std. Dev. 282 59 109 159 256 218 173 
CV 0.32 2.45 1.45 0.97 0.28 0.23 0.17 
Pine 
Tree 
Hybrid 980.86 13.68 46.84 110.13 995 1028 1091 
Std. Dev. 330 44 91 145 314 285 246 
CV 0.34 3.22 1.94 1.32 0.32 0.28 0.23 
Conv. 851.73 8.50 30.72 77.28 860 882 929 
Std. Dev. 269 33 68 111 258 237 204 
CV 0.32 3.88 2.21 1.44 0.30 0.27 0.22 
 
Note: Mean indemnities are estimated over 1,000 iterations 
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Table 9. Regression estimates of paddy yield for hybrid and conventional rice cultivars 
Variable (1) (2)
Intercept 3.4766*** 2.9080*** 
w1TDN -0.0003*** -0.0002
w2TDN 0.0001* 0.0005***
w1VPD 0.2771*** 0.2522
w2VPD -0.5649*** -1.3816***
w1SOLAR -0.0001** -0.0002**
w2SOLAR 0.0001*** 0.0003***
w1w2AvgT 0.0791*** 0.1167***
Corning 0.0826*** 0.1799***
Keiser 0.0447** 0.0036
Newport 0.0542*** 0.1645***
PineTree 0.0190 0.0672
Rohwer -0.0261 -0.0346
Regression Statistics 
Sample Size 2058 460 
R-Square 0.1131 0.2919 
F Value 21.74 15.35 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression results for conventional 
cultivar model (1) and hybrid cultivar model (2). Values in 
columns (1) and (2) are the coefficient estimates of the independent 
variables in column “Variable”. For this model, Stuttgart is the 
base location. Also, *, **, *** represent statistical significance at 
the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Standard errors are 
heteroscedasticity robust. 
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Table 10. Regression estimates of MRY for hybrid and conventional rice cultivars 
Variable (1) (2) 
Intercept  1.6042*** 1.6249*** 
w1TD33 0.0004*** 0.0006*** 
w2TD33 0.0000 0.0000 
w1TN22 -0.0009*** -0.0012*** 
w2TN22 -0.0007*** -0.0007*** 
HMC -0.0021*** 0.0005 
Corning -0.1352*** -0.1387*** 
Keiser -0.1159*** -0.0609*** 
Newport -0.1283*** -0.1200*** 
PineTree 0.0004 -0.0033 
Rohwer -0.1306*** -0.1457*** 
Regression Statistics   
Sample Size 2058 460 
R-Square 0.2528 0.3467 
F Value 69.26 23.83 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression results for conventional 
cultivar model (1) and hybrid cultivar model (2). Values in 
columns (1) and (2) are the coefficient estimates of the independent 
variables in column “Variable”. For this model, Stuttgart is the 
base location. Also, *, **, *** represent statistical significance at 
the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Standard errors are 
heteroscedasticity robust. 
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Table 11. Regression estimates of HRY for hybrid and conventional rice cultivars 
Variable (1) (2)
Intercept 4.1242*** 3.6030*** 
w1TD33 0.0014*** 0.0002 
w2TD33 -0.0012** 0.0000 
w1TN22 -0.0039*** -0.0023***
w2TN22 -0.0028*** -0.0031***
HMC 0.0913*** 0.0339
HMC2 -0.0015*** -0.0005
Corning -0.8783*** -0.3493***
Keiser -0.4662*** -0.3427***
Newport -0.7504*** -0.3352***
PineTree -0.4140*** -0.2439**
Rohwer -1.0445*** -0.9195***
Regression Statistics 
Sample Size 2058 460 
R-Square 0.2731 0.3235 
F Value 69.88 19.48 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression results for conventional 
cultivar model (1) and hybrid cultivar model (2). Values in 
columns (1) and (2) are the coefficient estimates of the independent 
variables in column “Variable”. For this model, Stuttgart is the 
base location. Also, *, **, *** represent statistical significance at 
the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Standard errors are 
heteroscedasticity robust. 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Research locations in Arkansas 
 
Source: http://printerprojects.com/maps/arkansasblank.html  
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Figure 2.  Mean Indemnity Per Acre by RP, YP, and MRP at 70% Coverage Level 
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Figure 3. Indemnity Payment Frequency for RP, YP, and MRP at 70% Coverage Level 
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Figure 4.  Mean Producer Realized Revenue Plus Mean Indemnity Payments for RP, YP, and MRP at 70% Coverage Level 
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